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This is a brief, technical review of the Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) part 
of ITEM, a widely used theater combat model.  Several apparent deficiencies are 
pointed out.  The recommendation is that ITEM’s documentation be improved, 
and that a more extensive verification be carried out. 
Introduction 
This review is part of OPNAV (N81)’s Methodology Improvement Working 
Integrated Process Team (MI-WIPT) review of the ASW portion of the ITEM joint 
theater campaign model.  Specifically, my intention is to contribute to the Process Design 
Plan for ITEM.  My review is based entirely on the technical manual and selected source 
code provided by SAIC.  My primary qualification for reviewing the ASW portion is 
knowledge of stochastic processes and search theory (Washburn (2002)).  I also have 
some experience in constructing combat models, both Monte Carlo and deterministic. 
This review should be regarded as incomplete.  It was initiated due to the author’s 
interest in the subject, and then terminated due to lack of funding.  A more in-depth 
review would involve installing and repeatedly running ITEM, which I have not done.  
Section 5 includes recommendations for continuation. 
SAIC has been most cooperative in helping me to review the ASW portion ITEM.  I 
have revised an earlier version of this document based on input from Steve Vedder at 
SAIC.  SAIC has also been helpful in providing documentation and answering my 
questions on how ITEM works.  The comments that follow, however, are entirely my 
own. 
1. The Aggregation Issue 
ITEM is a deterministic, time-stepped, campaign level model.  Although it is 
deterministic, ITEM deals with probabilities and expected values, particularly in the 
ASW part.  This is a potential source of inaccuracy in a deterministic model, more so 
than in a Monte Carlo model.  The level of aggregation is crucial. 
Let us compare two models of a ship passing through a minefield under the 
assumption that there are ten mines in the minefield, each of which will independently 
damage the ship with probability 0.07.  The issue is whether the ship is damaged by at 
least one mine.  Model 1 is a Monte Carlo simulation where each mine is tested against a 
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random number to determine whether the ship is damaged.  If the ship survives every 
mine, then it survives the minefield.  Now, the probability that the ship is damaged by 
some mine in this situation is exactly 1 – (1 – 0.07)10 = 0.516, an aggregated probability 
for the whole minefield.  Model 1 might therefore test a single random number against 
0.516, thus saving itself the trouble of generating nine random numbers.  The results are 
equivalent; it does not matter whether one random number is tested against 0.516 or ten 
random numbers are tested against 0.07. 
Model 2, like ITEM, does not employ random numbers.  The approach is to first 
compute the probability of the event under consideration, and then declare that the event 
has happened if the probability exceeds some input threshold T, typically in the vicinity 
of 0.5.  Model 2 is not ITEM, unless by accident.  This is a review of the ASW part of 
ITEM, not the mine warfare part, and I do not know how ITEM models mine warfare.  I 
am using a mine warfare example only because of my own familiarity with the type. In 
the aggregated minefield example, the ship would be damaged because 0.516 exceeds the 
0.5 threshold.  However, the ship would not be damaged if the mines were examined one 
at a time.  Even if the inequality is checked ten times, 0.07 is not larger than 0.5.  The 
results of the deterministic model thus depend on the level of aggregation, with high 
levels of aggregation being best. 
Ideally, a deterministic model would compute only some ultimate probability such as 
the probability of sanitizing a region within 48 hours, and then employ the threshold 
exactly once to decide whether the event happens.  The trouble is that the analog of 
raising 0.93 to the tenth power is usually not available for complicated events such as 
sanitizing an area of the ocean; indeed, the whole motivation for constructing a model in 
the first place may be the clear impossibility of computing the probability of such highly 
aggregated events.  Monte Carlo simulation responds well to building up an aggregated 
picture out of details, but deterministic models do not.  The specific danger in time-
stepped deterministic models is that the probabilities will all be so small that nothing will 
ever happen, as in the minefield example. 
As the above example illustrates, deterministic models of random phenomena are 
harder to write accurately than are Monte Carlo simulations.  The Monte Carlo analyst, if 
unaware of the right method for aggregating mines, can simply go over the mines one at a 
time.  If he happens to know the right aggregation method, the effect is to slightly 
increase the efficiency of the simulation, but the accuracy is unaffected.  The 
deterministic analyst does not have the option of simply writing a loop around a simple 
operation, and must continually search for opportunities to aggregate accurately.  This 
may be difficult.  If there were mines of a second type present, for example, each with a 
different probability of damaging the ship, then they should all be aggregated together.  
That is easily said, but there are situations where “aggregating everything together” is not 
easy.  What if a second ship goes through the minefield?  The number of mines 
remaining may have been decremented by the first ship, since a mine can detonate only 
once.  Should we subtract one from the number of mines remaining?  If so, from which 
mine type?  Should we instead subtract the probability that the ship is damaged from the 
number of mines remaining (subtract the expected number of mines lost, in other words)?  
If so, we must be prepared to continually cope with the possibility that the number of 
mines remaining is not an integer.  What if a second ship deliberately follows the first 
ship?  If the first ship has survived, then her luck should transfer to the second, since the 
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first has more or less proved that there are no mines in the transit channel.  For this 
question, the expected value idea does not provide even a partial remedy.  These 
questions can all be easily addressed in a Monte Carlo model, but a deterministic model 
will have to either grow complicated or introduce inaccuracies.  The mine warfare 
community has been preoccupied with the aggregation issue for decades, seeking a 
deterministic model that is simple, while retaining what T. J. Horrigan calls 
“configuration”. 
I do not mean to argue against deterministic models.  They are simple, fast, and 
reproducible—all powerful virtues.  It is also true that the simplicity of the Monte Carlo 
paradigm can lead to the incorporation of detail to the point where Monte Carlo models 
cease to be simple or even useful, witness the recent demise of JWARS.  However, 
deterministic models are difficult to write accurately, much more so than is a Monte 
Carlo simulation of the same situation. 
The creators of ITEM are clearly aware of the aggregation issue, since probabilities 
are aggregated over time before being subjected to a threshold.  There are still some 
aggregation issues, however, as will be pointed out in the appropriate place below.  In the 
meantime, bear in mind that deterministic models of random phenomena are most 
reliable when the number of threshold tests is as small as possible. 
2. General Approach to Search 
ITEM’s general approach to search is to aggregate detection probability over time by 
assuming that detections in distinct time intervals are independent.  If P(t) represents the 
cumulative detection probability at time t and p(t) represents the (non-cumulative) 
detection probability in a time interval of length ∆ surrounding t, then the operative 
update formula is  
( ) 1 (1 ( ))(1 (P t P t p t+ ∆ = − − − )) . 
In other words, there will be a detection before t+∆ unless there is no detection before 
t and no detection in the interval [t, t+∆].  In the limit where ∆ approaches 0 and p(t) is  
proportional to ∆, this leads to P(t)=1 - exp(-Kt), where K is the proportionality constant.  
With K=VW/A, this is the random search formula developed by Koopman and his 
colleagues in World War II.  The same assumption can also be used to aggregate over 
platforms, as well as time.  The independence assumption is generally thought to be a 
realistic, perhaps slightly pessimistic, assumption about searchers who attempt to act 
coherently.  It is certainly appropriate for an aggregated, theater-level model like ITEM 
to make such an assumption. 
When targets move even while they are being sought, there is both bad news and 
good news for the searcher.  The bad news is that target movement tends to spoil 
coherent search plans.  The good news is that the target may find the searcher, rather than 
vice versa, since it is relative speed that matters.  The good news is handled in ITEM by 
the dynamic enhancement theory that was also developed in World War II, and the bad 
news is ignored. Given the commitment to random search, this is reasonable.  It is hard 
for movement to spoil the coherence of a plan that is not attempting to cohere. 
3 
3. Specific Issues and Errors 
This section is keyed to various sections a.b.c of the ITEM Technical Manual (SAIC, 
2003). 
 
13.3.7 Compute Probability of Detection of Submarines versus ASW Platforms 
Suppose m searchers look for n submarines in some fixed area A, with searcher i 
having speed Vi and sweepwidth Wij against submarine j.  The rate at which i detects j is 
rij≡ViWij/A, and the mean time for i to detect j is the reciprocal of this quantity. ITEM 
does not go over the submarines one at a time, calculating a detection probability for each 
one.  Instead, ITEM sums all of the detection rates to obtain one superdetection rate 
, the rate at which some searcher detects some submarine, and the time at 
which a report gets generated is based on this sum over both targets and searchers.  The 
high rate r will lead to short times; the more vehicles are present in the area, the faster 
something will happen.  The problem in ITEM occurs not with finding the first 








To be specific, suppose that m=1, n=5, and rij=1 for all searchers and submarines.  
Suppose further that submarines don’t shoot back, and that every submarine is sunk as 
soon as it is found.  The initial rate of detection is 5, so the time until the first submarine 
is detected/sunk is 1/5=.2.  Once the first submarine is sunk, there are only four left, so 
the additional time until the second is detected/sunk is .25.  The additional time for the 
last submarine will be 1, on the average, in agreement with the intuitive notion that 
finding the last object always takes longer than finding the first.  The exact total time to 
find and sink all 5 submarines is 0.2 + 0.25 +0.33 + 0.5 + 1 =2.28, on the average.  In 
ITEM, the comparable computation would be to solve 1 – exp( - rt) = T1 for t, where T1 
is the detection threshold and r=5, the initial detection rate.  The solution is 0.14 if 
T1=0.5; smaller than the correct value by a factor of about 16.  The comparison would 
not be so bad in an example where ITEM could exercise its capability of gradually 
eliminating submarines as they are killed, particularly if the submarines all differed a lot 
from each other, but the magnitude of the error in this simple example should nonetheless 
give one pause.  If the searchers were trying to “sanitize” an area that includes several 
similar submarines, there could be a significant exaggeration of the speed with which 
they could do it. 
It may not be important to fix detection problems, since detections are essentially 
independent of engagements as ITEM is currently organized.  However, engagements are 
handled similarly, and there the issue is important.  I don’t know how to fix it.  The 
present model sacrifices the average to get an extreme (the first detection time) right.  I 
would be more inclined to get the average right by treating the submarines independently, 
one at a time, thus sacrificing extremes for the average.  In my simple example, this 
would result in killing all five submarines at time 0.693, a time five times as large as the 
current value.  This would still significantly understate the sanitization time, while also 
overstating the time of first detection. 
In general, search in ITEM is conducted by units whose locations are not specified, 
except that they lie within a known area A, for targets whose locations are not specified, 
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except that they lie within a different area B.  Let AB be the intersection of the two areas.  
Having computed a target’s detection probability, ITEM corrects it by multiplying it by 
the ratio AB/B.  The implied assumption is that a sub is stationary over a time period of 
length ∆, and is equally likely to be anywhere within B.  Another implied assumption is 
that all searchers in A manage to be in the overlap area AB, since there is no similar 
searcher correction.  One might argue that, in any scenario where all of the searchers in A 
are actively searching in AB, their targets would tend to concentrate in the part of B that 
is not in A, rather than simply distributing themselves at random.  If one were to so argue, 
then the implied assumptions would be optimistic.  These implied assumptions are my 
invention.  Although the technical manual makes clear which formulas are in use, it does 
not actually make clear what assumptions lie behind them. 
What would ITEM do if searcher area A overlapped two separate sub areas, B1 and 
B2?  Would the searchers simultaneously appear in both overlap areas? 
There is another overlap issue here.  Detections in separate time intervals are assumed 
to be independent, so the events that a target is in the joint area in separate time intervals 
are assumed to be independent.  In effect, each target is assumed to be moving around 
rapidly enough in B that its position ∆ from now is independent from its current position.  
If the dimensions of B are 30 × 30 nm, and if ∆=10 min, then the implied target speed is 
on the order of 180 kt.  While this may be acceptable, I think it is clear that the time 
interval should not be made even smaller by some user who is under the impression that 
smaller is better.  If ∆=1 min, for example, then, in a 10 min period, there will be 10 
opportunities for detection, and the cumulative effect may be such that the detection 
probability exceeds the probability that the target is in the joint area.  For example, if 
VW/A=1 per min and if the inclusion probability is .1, the detection probability in 1 min 
is .1(1 – exp( - 1))=0.0632.  This is, as expected, smaller than the inclusion probability.  
However, the detection probability in 10 min is 1 - (1 - .0632)10 = 0.48, which is much 
greater than the inclusion probability.  How can one detect a target that isn’t even there? 
There is also a conceptual error in this section; namely, the statement that the areas 
swept by various platforms do not overlap.  Given the random search formula that is in 
use, the assumption is actually that the areas do overlap to the extent implied by having 
the platforms patrol in an unorganized fashion.  If they did not overlap, we would not be 
using the random search formula.  Adding up the areas is nonetheless the right thing to 
do. 
 
13.3.9 Compute Probability of Detection of ASW Platforms versus Submarines 
There are three sources of ASW detection in ITEM: platforms, SOSUS, and aircraft.  
Each source has an independent detection probability: p1, p2, or p3.  ITEM wisely 
aggregates the three numbers into one before subjecting the result to a threshold, but 
unfortunately aggregates them by simply taking the largest of the three.  If the sources are 
independent, the probability that at least one of them detects the target is 
1 21 (1 )(1 )(1 )3p p p− − − − , which is always larger than the maximum.  Using the 
maximum is a pessimistic error.  The fix is to use the formula given above.  In other 
words, the same idea being used to aggregate over time (multiply independent failure 
probabilities together) should also be used to aggregate over detection sources. 
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13.3.10 Compute Cumulative Sonar Probability of Detection 
I do not understand the motive for calculating only one sonar probability of detection 
(PD), instead of one for each target, given that each target is already a separate object 
with its own survival probability.  That would avoid the necessity of using the average 
value of the evasion probability (p_evade) to correct for evasion.  The implied 
assumption about evasion is that, every time a detection occurs, the submarine 
immediately makes the detection inoperative with probability p_evade.  The experience 
of the searcher would simply be one of fewer observed detections for evasive submarines, 
so p_evade might be measured as the ratio of the detection rate for evasive submarines to 
the detection rate for unevasive submarines.  I cannot otherwise imagine how to 
determine p_evade from actual experiments, and suspect that it is simply an outright 
guess on the part of the user. 
 
13.3.11 Compute Cumulative SOSUS Probability of Detection 
This section of the manual does not correspond to the way SOSUS detections are 
currently handled in ITEM.  See Section 4 for comments based on source code. 
 
13.3.12 Compute Cumulative Radar Probability of Detection 
Detection of periscopes and snorkels by radar are handled similarly in ITEM, so I will 
only comment on periscopes. 
The radar detection range is handled by including a detection range for a standard 
periscope in the data, and then adjusting it based on the assumption that the signal-to-
noise ratio is proportional to the radar cross section of the actual periscope and the 
inverse fourth power of range (hence the ¼ power of rel_det_periscope in the equation 
for ac_search_area).  This seems reasonable to me, but technical experts might be able to 
supply a slightly different power, or find a way of incorporating a radar horizon.  Making 
the corresponding change in ITEM would be trivial, but perhaps significant. 
The data also include an item called pd_scope that is subsequently used to modify the 
area swept.  This is an error.  Once one has determined the detection range against 
periscopes, it does not make sense to later say that maybe those weren’t really detections 
after all.  I cannot imagine how such a number could be realistically measured or 
estimated.  It should be eliminated (taken to be 1.0). 
The overlap question is handled differently in this section than in 13.3.7.  If A and B 
overlap, then the joint probability is p_overlap = (AB/A)(AB/B), rather than just AB/B as 
before.  Now the aircraft, in addition to the subs, are assumed to be randomly distributed 
over their patrol area.  Furthermore, p_overlap is incorporated into the coverage ratio, 
rather than applied as a correction to p_scope_detect.  The implied assumption is that 
both aircraft and subs are moving about rapidly within their patrol areas, even within an 
interval of length ∆.  The same assumption is applied to the periscope duty cycle; that is, 
the submarine is in effect assumed to raise and lower its periscope several times within 
each period of length ∆, even while exposing it only the given fraction of the time (duty 
cycle).  The same high frequency assumption is applied to aircraft motion, sub motion, 
and periscope exposure.  Note that p_scope_detect can approach 1.0, thus exceeding both 
periscope_duty_cycle and p_overlap. 
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There is no easy fix for this.  One could, of course, first calculate p_scope_detect and 
then correct it by multiplying by periscope_duty_cycle and p_overlap.  This would keep 
p_scope_detect below each factor and make the treatment parallel 13.3.7, but then I 
would complain as I did in that section.  The basic problem is that periscope_duty_cycle 
does not sufficiently describe periscope emergences because nothing having the units of 
time is in the database.  Given that a periscope is up, say, 1/60th of the time, it matters 
whether it stays up for one hour out of sixty or one second per minute.  The latter 
corresponds to what is currently done, the former corresponds to the correction factor 
approach, and the truth is probably somewhere in between.  The subject is really just too 
difficult for a simple deterministic model to get right. 
Historically, I believe that the most common method of detecting periscopes has been 
by eyeball.  Perhaps that will change with better radar systems, but it is odd that eyeballs 
are missing from the list of periscope detection mechanisms. 
 
13.3.13 Generate ASW Sensor Contact Report 
A report is issued whenever any of three cumulative detection probabilities exceeds a 
threshold, one for each platform type.  Perhaps only one threshold should be applied to 
the three jointly, in accordance with the idea that the fewer such tests, the better.  
Cumulative detection probabilities can only go up, so, once a report is issued, there will 
be a report issued in every interval thereafter. 
 
13.3.14 Compute the Probability that ASW Platforms Engage Submarines 
 
Detections are not currently coupled to engagements in ITEM, so all of the detection 
parameters can be changed without affecting the course of the war, at least as far as 
attrition is concerned.  Attrition is handled through a completely separate engagement 
process. 
The detection and engagement processes are mathematically similar, differing 
primarily in that engagement ranges are smaller than detection ranges.  The procedure is 
clear enough, but I don’t see the logic behind it.  Actual engagements are triggered by 
detections, with the detecting platform either cueing some other platform or closing to 
within engagement range.  The fact that engagement ranges are smaller than detection 
ranges is barely relevant as far as predicting the number of engagements is concerned.  
Nonetheless, ITEM proceeds by replacing the detection range with an engagement range, 
calculating an engagement coverage ratio, and ultimately updating a cumulative 
engagement probability in each time period, the same basic process that is used for 
detections.  The engagement range is simply the minimum of the weapon range and the 
detection range, except that the detection range is first subjected to reduction by being 
multiplied by an engagement_factor.  Earlier comments about detection apply equally to 
engagements, but some new issues arise. 
 
13.3.15 Process ASW Engagement 
 
When cumAswPe exceeds a threshold, all submarines in the associated area are 
subjected to attack.  In fact, unless they are evasive submarines, they will be subjected to 
attack in every succeeding interval, since cumAswPe will never decrease.  This is 
harmless enough in the case of detections, but is likely to result in the quick demise of 
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nonevasive submarines.  I don’t think that this makes sense.  Results are certainly very 
sensitive to the length of the time interval ∆, since there is an attack every ∆.  If ∆ were 
very small, nonevasive submarines would disappear instantly, as soon as they are 
engaged.  The best case would be if ∆ were the length of time required to make the 
typical extended ASW attack, but that surely exceeds the ten-minute standard of ITEM.  
Here is one possible fix: 
• Every time cumAswPe crosses a threshold, an engagement occurs and the 
submarine instantaneously suffers a change of state with various given 
probabilities.  These probabilities correspond to probabilities that apply for 
attacks that continue until contact with the target is lost (not for attacks that 
continue for ∆). 
• Every time cumAswPe crosses a threshold, it it reset to 0.  This represents the 
idea that attacks only cease because contact has been lost. 
Resetting cumAswPe to 0 will prevent the current cascade of attacks.  The new 
interpretation of cumAswPe is “probability that there has been an engagement in the time 
since the most recent attack”.  The meaning of ASW_salvo_size would have to be 
changed to “average number of weapons used in prosecuting a submarine until contact is 
lost”, and other changes of interpretation might also be necessary. 
Two state probabilities are tracked for each sub: the probability of survival 
(p_survival) and the probability that the combat system is still operative (p_scop).  When 
the submarine is attacked, the two are updated using the formulas 
_ _ (1 ),  and _ _ (1 )p survival p survival Pk p csop p csop Pc← − ← − , 
where Pk and Pc are the probabilities of killing the sub and knocking out its combat 
system, respectively.  Both of these numbers are essentially data, albeit data scaled to 
account for the number of shots.  My concern is with the meaning of Pc.  If I were asked 
to estimate that number, I would interpret it as the probability of knocking out the combat 
system, given that the submarine otherwise survives the attack.  My reason for the 
condition is that functioning of the combat system is irrelevant if the submarine is dead.  
With that interpretation, Pc could exceed Pk.  Now that I can see the update equations, I 
can see that the correct interpretation for Pc is actually the probability that either the 
submarine is killed or the combat system is knocked out or both.  With that interpretation, 
p_scop never exceeds p_survival, and p_scop retains its desired meaning as the 
probability that the submarine is still both alive and functioning.  That meaning is 
desired, I think, because p_scop is a factor in computing the number of salvos fired by the 
submarine in any future engagement.  My point is that a user asked to input Pc is likely to 
interpret it incorrectly. 
Once cumAswPe exceeds its threshold for nonevasive targets, it will remain above 
the threshold for all future time intervals, and the target will continue to absorb salvos 
until its p_survival has decreased below the survival threshold.  In each time period, 
cumAswPe is used to initialize salvos_expended.  Although the technical manual omits 
the factor, salvos_expended is one of several factors in salvos_engagement. 
Let’s make a small comparison.  Suppose we have only one searcher, one target, and 
one weapon with kill probability Pk to launch in each time period.  The target is assumed 
to be nonevasive and to not shoot back, so the shooter’s p_scop remains 1 throughout.  
Assuming that we shoot-look-shoot until the target is killed, the true average number of 
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weapons expended is 1/Pk.  For comparison, in ITEM we will first wait until cumAswPe 
exceeds its threshold T1 before taking the first shot at the target.  We will continue to 
shoot in successive periods until the target’s survival probability decreases from 1 to the 
survival threshold T2.  The survival probability decreases by a factor of (1-T1*Pk) in 
each period (the technical manual would have this factor being (1 - Pk), but the manual’s 
equation for salvos_engagement differs from the ITEM code in not including the factor 
salvos_expended).  Therefore, the number of periods required is log(T2)/log(1-T1*Pk), 
after which the target will be deleted and no further action will be taken against it.  
Ignoring the fact that cumAswPe will grow slightly with each period, the number of shots 
in each period is T1 on account of the aforementioned initialization, so the total number 




= − .  The default values for T1 and 
T2 are 0.1 and 0.5.  If Pk=0.5, that means ShotsITEM =  1.35, to be compared with the 
reciprocal of Pk, or 2.  A fix here would be to take T2 to be exp(-1)=.368, rather than the 
current .5, but there may be other good reasons for leaving T2 at .5.  If T1 were set to .5, 
we would have ShotsITEM =  1.20; that is, for this purpose it is important that T1 be kept 
small compared to .5. 
 
13.3.17 Decrement Detection and Engagement Probabilities 
 
Evasion probabilities are used for two purposes.  One is during the search phase, 
where the effect of the evasion probability is to decrease the sweepwidth as earlier 
described in 13.3.10.  That same logic is used in computing cumAswPe.  So far, there is 
no effect that would make cumAswPe decrease; it is merely a matter of how fast it 
increases.  However, the second use of evasion is right after an engagement, where 
cumAswPe is multiplied by (1 - p_evade).  The effect is to reduce cumAswPe.  It is no 
longer possible to interpret the quantity as the cumulative probability of engagement 
since time 0, since that quantity can only increase with time.  Nor can we interpret it as 
the cumulative probability of engagement since the last engagement, since that quantity 
would have to get reduced to 0 after every engagement.  Is there any reasonable 
interpretation we can place on cumAswPe that will justify the way it is used in ITEM? 
The technical manual does not address the issue, but here is one possibility.  Assume that 
• During the search phase, ASW makes occasional contacts that might result in an 
engagement, but does not act immediately.  Some of these contacts are 
immediately foiled by evasive targets and are therefore inoperative, but the rest 
are used to initiate or continue target tracking.  Except at the moment of 
engagement, track is never lost, once established. 
• In any interval when cumAswPe exceeds a threshold, ASW engages the target. 
• After an engagement, a surviving submarine will attempt to evade.  The ASW 
track is lost if and only if the submarine’s attempt succeeds. 
If the evasion attempt succeeds, cumAswPe is reduced to 0.  If it fails, cumAswPe is not 
affected, since ASW is still tracking.  The new cumAswPe is therefore the old value 
times the nonevasion probability plus 0 times the evasion probability, as ITEM 
calculates.  After being reduced by the possibly successful evasion, cumAswPe resumes 
the process of increasing.  The required interpretation of cumAswPe is “probability that 
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the submarine is currently being tracked”.  Note that the evasion probability does not 
affect the submarine’s ultimate fate or ultimate munitions consumption, but only has the 
effect of delay. 
4. Other Observations 
SAIC has provided me with a paper copy of the ASW source code, which has on 
several occasions clarified doubts left by the technical manual.  In the process of perusing 
the source code, I have noticed the following: 
• In computing the area covered by SOSUS, the first step is to find the SOSUS 
detection range R.  SOSUS doesn’t move, so the relative motion comes from the 
submarines themselves.  The area covered by SOSUS is taken to be πR2 for 
stationary subs, or 2VR∆ for subs with positive speed V.  I have several objections 
to this. 
o The area covered is a discontinuous function of V.  A sub with speed  
.00001 kt will cover less area than a sub with speed 0. 
o The sweepwidth should be R, rather than 2R, since SOSUS only looks in one 
direction. 
o Even R is too large, since subs don’t always patrol normally to the SOSUS 
beam. 
o What about the angular width of SOSUS coverage?  Should it not enter the 
computation? 
o The area covered for a stationary sub might better be taken to be 0 than πR2.  
For SOSUS, πR2 might be 104 nm2.  If ∆ is the standard ten minutes, this 
corresponds to sweeping 60,000 nm2/hr.  That seems large to me.  The same 
issues occur in assessing the effectiveness of sonobuoys.  ITEM essentially 
assumes that sonobuoys have infinite lifetimes, but are only operative if a P-3 
is available to monitor them.  This seems reasonable, but the assumption that 
stationary sensors effectively move through the water at the submarine’s 
speed, while in accord with the dynamic enhancement theory, is optimistic.  
An alternative analytic model of sonobuoys is the one by Cox (1972). 
• The dynamic enhancement theory requires an integral whose symbol is ek in the 
technical manual.  The integral is actually a complete elliptic integral of the 
second kind, approximated in ITEM by a power series.  Elliptic integrals are not 
well approximated by power series, so ITEM’s ek can be in error by about 2%, in 
spite of including terms up to the 18th power.  While this is not a large error, there 
are methods for approximating ek that are simpler and more accurate. 
5. Recommendations 
If ITEM is to be further developed, then it is my opinion that development should 
take the course of debugging and verification, rather than enhancement.  Since even my 
cursory inspection of the technical manual and code has revealed several serious 
problems, there is reason to suspect others. 
The first step should be to revise the technical manual.  Errors and omissions such as 
the ones that I have found should be corrected.  Equally important, the assumptions on 
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which ITEM is built should be made explicit.  At the moment, the technical manual has a 
strong tendency to explain what equations are being used, without explaining how the 
equations follow from the assumptions being made about combat, or at least how they 
approximate what should follow from those assumptions.  Assumptions that I have earlier 
claimed are being made implicitly should be made explicitly.  Verification is the process 
of convincing ourselves that the computer code correctly implements the model that we 
have in mind.  Until the model is made clear, verification is impossible. 
Some of the processes in ITEM are underspecified.  The periscope emergence process 
is one of them, since it specifies a duty cycle without saying anything about timing.  For 
periscopes I suggest assuming that submerged periscopes emerge in a Poisson process 
with rate λ, remaining up for a period d before being retracted.  The duty cycle in that 
case would be λd/(1+λd), which is already part of ITEM’s data, but two parameters are 
needed if the process is to be completely specified.  Another underspecified process is 
how platforms move about within their areas. 
The simplest way to verify the various components of ITEM would be to pose a 
collection of tactical problems such as the ones I have introduced above.  The tactical 
problems should be simple enough to permit solution by means other than ITEM, so that 
results can be compared.  I think it likely that carrying out a sequence of such 
comparisons would reveal errors in ITEM that I have missed, but which should be 
corrected.  It might also reveal how to set ITEM’s thresholds.  A program to accomplish 
this would be appropriate for the Naval Postgraduate School.  It would cost on the order 
of $100,000, depending on scope, and would be spread over about two years to permit the 
formulation of theses. 
Nunn and Heimerman (1994) reviewed version 5.2.3 of ITEM.  They say that 
 
“Almost every time that the review team made a test run involving a 
previously unused module of code, it encountered some shortcoming 
in the documentation or ‘bug’ in the code.  It is very unlikely that all 
such surprises were encountered during this review.  We recommend 
that ITEM undergo verification testing to ensure that the design was 
faithfully implemented into the code.” 
 
The current version of ITEM is no doubt much improved from version 5.2.3.  
Nonetheless, ten years later, I can only say that I agree. 
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